A Truthity Gaffitation?

Introduction: On October 13, 2022, Minnesota Representative Angie Craig debated Tyler Kistner as part of her bid for re-election. During the course of this debate, she said; “I will never stop standing up for Big Pharma and standing against my constituents!” This was likely a mistake, but was this a mere misstatement or an instance of saying the quiet part out loud, so to speak? Breitbart News produced the argument in question in an effort to convince its readers that Craig’s comments were in fact a telling moment in which she revealed her true agenda

Key Facts:

Text: These paragraphs can be found in the middle of the article in question.

“In fact, the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) noted that Craig’s slip of the tongue shows the truth, which is that she always stands with Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA).

“Angie Craig accidentally admitted the truth: she always stands with Pelosi and against the interests of Minnesota families,” said NRCC spokesman Mike Berg.

The congresswoman has voted with the Speaker 100 percent of the time in the current Congress and 99 percent in the last Congress. Additionally, during President Joe Biden’s time in office, she has voted with him 100 percent of the time.”


Comments: It might be interesting to actually break down the statistical information on votes relating to the pharmaceutical industry in more detail, but that is beyond the scope of this post.

Statements: The argument includes a few complex statements which have broken up into their individual components. This in turn has left us with a couple instances of redundant statements. Some of this is reported speech, but the credibility of the source does not appear to be critical to the argument, so the source citation is treated here as a contextualization cue [a]. While Statement 1 is clearly the conclusion of the argument, as stated, it seems clear that the real point is to suggest that Craig really believes what she says in this instance, so a final unstated conclusion [5] has been spelled out here.

[1a] In fact, the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) noted that Craig’s slip of the tongue shows the truth,

[2a] [Angie Craig] always stands with Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA).

[1b] “Angie Craig accidentally admitted the truth:

[2b] she always stands with Pelosi and

[3] [Angie Craig always stands] against the interests of Minnesota families,”

[a] said NRCC spokesman Mike Berg.

[4] The congresswoman has voted with the Speaker 100 percent of the time in the current Congress and 99 percent in the last Congress. Additionally, during President Joe Biden’s time in office, she has voted with him 100 percent of the time.

[5] [Angie Craig actively supports big pharma against the interests of her own constituents.]

[6] Nancy Pelosi consistently represents big pharma in Congress.

Diagram: The following seems to represent the reasoning of the argument, with statement 4 offering a statistical summary of Craig’s history of voting with Nancy Pelosi as evidence for a generalization that she always votes with Pelosi. This then is added to an unsupported side comment about how she stands against her constituents to argue for the notion that her statement was an accurate reflection of her actual politics, all of which is meant to show that she really does stand up for big pharma and against the interests of her own constituents.

Discussion: This argument raises the following issues; Ad Hominem, Contextualization, Indexicality, Interactional Eclipse, Meta-Reasoning, Misstatement, Red Herring, Tell, Semantics, Statistical Reasoning, Unsupported Claims.

Ad Hominem: Insofar as this argument takes Craig’s summary statement as an indication of her real stance on big pharma, it provides an excuse to ignore the rest of her commentary on the topic at hand. In effect, this an ad hominem (circumstantial), in which an accusation about Craig’s real interest in the subject is used to dismiss the rest of her arguments on the subject.

Contextualization: Insofar as this argument turns on a question about the intent of a speaker (Craig), it is explicitly focused on context-specific information.

Indexicality: The Breitbart article rests a great of its case on the notion that Craig’s statement reflects a pattern actually present in her voting behavior. In effect, they are telling us that her voting pattern matches the significance of the statement in question, making it a truthful claim rather than a mere misstatement. They are thus treating her statement as a kind of indexical icon reflecting her actual politics. Whether or not voting in concert with Nancy Pelosi really constitutes a pattern of support for big pharma is another question, but the folks at Breitbart clearly think it does.

Interactional Eclipse: The real work of this article probably has less to do with the effort to convince people that Craig meant what she said than the effort to reinforce the framing of the issue. While readers may or may not come away thinking that Craig really means to support big pharma, the presupposition that Nancy Pelosi is uniquely supportive of big pharma is provided as an absolute given for this argument. In effect, the author is replacing questions about actual votes on actual issues related to medicine, which were the substance of Craig’s own arguments on the topic, with a simple rubric in which any association with Nancy Pelosi is taken to be evidence of support for big pharma. This impression is not contingent on accepting the conclusion of the argument, and it will have far more lasting impact than anything at stake in this particular argument. The long-term game for the author’s of this argument may have less to do with Craig or the election in question than the effort to poison the well for Democratic leadership. Likely, the normal value of an argument, as am effort to prove the truth of its conclusion is neither the practical goal nor the practical effect of this particular argument.

Meta-Reasoning: Insofar as this is an argument about an argument, the one made by Craig, this is an example of meta-reasoning, specifically it is an argument in which a statement completely out of line with the rest of her comments on the topic at hand may be taken as her real stance on the issue while setting aside anything else she has to say about the subject.

Misstatement: Given the argument Angie Craig was making before uttering the statement in question, it seems quite obvious that she misstated the point she meant to make. Whether this was an honest mistake or something akin to a liar’s tell or even a Freudian slip would seem to be the point of the argument Breitbart makes. Absent any good reason to believe this statement reflected her real views, however, it seems best to think of this as merely a misstatement and nothing more.

Red Herring: The notion that association with Nancy Pelosi constitutes support for Big Pharma is a red herring. The Breitbart piece makes no effort to establish its relevance. Still, Pelosi has taken donations from big pharmaceutical companies and one can find many articles from both the left and right taking her to task for their influence on her politics. Just how much this differs from Mitch McConnell and countless other Congressmen on both sides of the aisle is another question, but the issue here is not whether or not Pelosi handles the issue well; it is whether or not Craig does. An abstract comparison of Craig’s voting behavior to that of Pelosi works only if Pelosi is uniquely supportive, and really only if Craig can be shown to have been similarly supportive in key votes wherein the interests of big pharma actually diverge from those of the public. But of course anyone prepared to make such a case would hardly need to reference Pelosi in order to do so; they could just attack Craig’s votes directly.

Another red herring in this argument arises when you consider the fact that Craig’s record of voting with Nancy Pelosi includes votes on a vast range of different topics, many of which have nothing to do with big pharma. Breitbart’s use in this argument effectively converts a record of unrelated votes into evidence of support for big pharma. This is quite deceptive.

Finally, the very notion that one should take Craig’s statement as indicative of her stance on the issue while ignoring her comments about actual legislation (including her criticism of Kistner) constitutes another red herring. It is an effort to treat a mistaken wording as the answer to a substantive problem.

Semantics: What counts as “big pharma” remains largely unspecified throughout this entire discussion. Craig herself does not address that, nor do her detractors. It’s tempting to think of the phrase as a free-floating signifier in this debate insofar as all interested parties seem to be against it without necessarily needed any specific reason to do so, or even any significant sense of what it is that they are supposed to be against.

Another issue buried in the question about what is or isn’t big pharma would be a question about whether or not all things that benefit big pharma are necessarily bad for the American people. Craig seems to take it as a forgone conclusion that opposition to big pharma is a good thing, and her detractors sloppy statistical arguments carry forward that same assumption. This side-steps any questions about the value of any particular view and the possibility that while the interests of big pharmaceutical companies may sometimes diverge from those of the public, they may also sometimes coincide. Treating the issue as an abstract case of being for or against big pharma thus obscures legitimate questions about the pros and cons of particular votes.

Statistical Reasoning: The Breitbart article tells us that Craig votes with Nancy Pelosi 100% of the time. In support of this, it links its readers to a post on Pro-Publica summarizing Craig’s votes in comparison to Pelosi’s for the years 21-22. The article does not break down the votes by topic. A point of clarification on the page reads as follows: “Correction (Nov. 15, 2019): This page originally included all votes on passage of a bill under the ‘Major Votes’ category. It now only includes votes designated as major by ProPublica.” The article concludes that the two voted in agreement 100% of the time.

A few significant questions could be raised about the statistical comparison, some of which have been mentioned elsewhere. If the difference between the results for ‘major bills’ and the total voting record I am unaware of it. How many of these bills are actually representative if issues affecting big pharma is another question. Whether or not any of them presented any significant difference between the interests of big pharma and those of the American people (or even those in Craig’s district) is yet another question altogether. And of course, none of this addresses the legislative process and any efforts made by either party to shape the legislation in question in support of or opposition to big pharma. The statistical argument made in Breitbart thus elides a number of important questions about the actual politics at issue.

Tell: The notion that someone could tell the truth, by accident so to speak, is often rooted in the notion that there may be some underlying psychological reason for the misstatement in question. Whether treating it as a kind Freudian slip or a liar’s tell (or that of a poker player), it is common to suppose that some deep-seated tension is leading to the unintended expression. Breitbart does not present an explicit claim to that effect, though some of the online commenters have. Their own strategy seems to have been to convince readers that the claim is true regardless of Craig’s reasons for saying it.

Unsupported Claims: The notion that Nancy Pelosi can be treated as a stand-in for big pharma remains entirely without support in this argument. Even if one grants that she supports big pharma, it would be reasonable to ask whether or not her support for the industry distinguished her from other members of Congress, include that if the Republican Party, or for that matter the candidate, Tyler Kistner. Absent evidence to that effect, the decision to treat Pelosi as a proxy for big pharma remains arbitrary. It is likely the argument rests on little more than a general sense of contempt that can be expected from Republican voters whenever Pelosi’s name comes up.

Evaluation: At the end of the day, this is little more than a red herring offered in support of a red herring. Craig misspoke and the Republican Party wants us to believe her gaff matters more than her explicit arguments on the topic. Toward that end, they remind us that she votes like Pelosi. this is irrelevancy piled on top of irrelevancy.

Final thoughts: I spent way too much time on this.

A Silent Pass?

Introduction: This quote appears expresses theme commonly appearing in progressive rhetoric of late, namely, the notion that phrases like “not all white people” are disingenuous and unnecessary responses to statements critical of whites. Similar arguments are made in other contexts of social justice advocacy and debate (e.g. sexism with “not all men.”)

Key Facts: The meme itself appears to be a quote from @chloemadaleine. I found a twitter account matching the name in question, but it is protected. So, I do not know of any particular details regarding the context in which this statement might have been made. As the meme is circulating about the net these days, it does occur to me that many will experience the argument with no more contextual than I have myself at this point.

Text: “If you’re white and not racist, you will not give a fuck about black people calling white people racist now. Because you know that what you’re saying does not apply to you. If you’re offended, you’re racist. It’s simple.”


Comments: The quote above arises out of a problem in the rhetoric of modern progressivism, namely an effort to address concerns about larger, systemic, patterns of social injustice (in this case racism) while retaining rhetoric that still calls out specific people for specific forms of behavior. The notion that some people are racist and some people aren’t hearkens back to more conventional definitions of racism, treating it as a toxic personal orientation whereas the tendency to produce sweeping generalizations is driven largely by an interest in racism as a larger social force which by definition functions to benefit white people. Either definition of racism works just fine on its own, but contemporary social justice advocates (at least in popular circles) tend to invoke the individualized model as accusation even as they insist on larger systemic models when defining what does or doesn’t count as racism. There may be scholars who handle this with more consistency, but the rhetoric of social justice seems caught between its own paradigm and those it disavows without quite leaving behind.

Critics of contemporary social justice advocates typically have a much easier time of it, often insisting on personal models of racism as the only ones that count, thus rendering discrimination against white people pretty much the same as discrimination against persons of color. This too distorts a lot of important issues.

Statements: I am treating item ‘b’ as adding emphasis rather than as a substantive part of the argument. It was tempting to think of a missing assumption in the form of a biconditional statement to the effect that such statements are objectionable/offensive to white people if and only if the white people in question are racist, but this doesn’t seem necessary. The actual text from the meme itself is sufficient to make sense of the argument.

[1] If you’re white and not racist, you will not give a fuck about black people calling white people racist now.

[a] Because

[2] [If you’re white and not racist] you know that what they’re saying does not apply to you.

[3] If you’re offended, you’re racist.

[b] It’s simple.”

Diagram: Unfortunately, the text only gives us one inference indicator [a] which tells us that statement 2 is a reason for something (surely, statement 1). Statement 3 is thrown in without any guidance as it to its relationship to the rest. So, we end up with several possible diagrams. We can start with an inference from 2 to1. Statement 3 is then either irrelevant commentary (diagram I), a second reason to accept statement 1 (diagram II), or a conclusion drawn from statement 1 (diagram III). Alternatively, statement 3 is a separate inference from statement 2 (diagram IV).

I’m inclined to think diagrams 3 and 4 are the most plausible, leaving us with either her last point as her main point or two separate conclusions, one suggesting that non-racists should not be threatened by statements about white racism and one suggesting that anyone who is threatened is guilty as charged, so to speak. Statement 3 packs a Hell of a punch, making it unwise to treat as irrelevant and also unlikely that the line was meant as a mere reason to think of something else. It either shares the stage wit the author’s first point as a final conclusion in its own right, or it was the whole point all along.

Discussion: This topic raises the following issues; Ad Hominem, False Alternatives, Interactional Eclipse, Masked Man Fallacy, Micro-Reasoning, Motte and Baily Doctrines, Bo True Scotsman Fallacy, Satire, Thought Policing, Transposition.

Ad Hominem: The suggestion that any whites who object to generalized statements about white racism must therefore themselves be racists is a classic ad hominem. It effectively refutes any concerns they might offer on the basis of a direct personal attack. Whether this is best thought of as a simple ad hominem (abusive) or the more complex ad hominem (circumstantial) is another question. As it does effectively comment on the motives and biases that whites bring to the issue, it is probably best to consider it a circumstantial.

False Alternatives: Insofar as this argument asks us to distinguish between white people who are racists and those who are not, this argument presents us with false alternatives. In fact, it does so on terms which should not arise at all in account taking the possibility of systemic racism seriously. Simply put, if racism is a feature if society as a whole, then the issue is not who is or is not racist; it is whether or not their specific words and deeds are contributing to racism in any way. It should go without saying under such a view that anyone could fall into racist patterns of thinking and talking. We can even suggest that white people might be more prone to this than others, or at least that we may plug into these patterns in particular ways. What we cannot do with any consistency is divide people (white or otherwise) into a simple binary set of those who are racist and those who are not.

Interactional Eclipse: Insofar as the argument accuses any white person objecting to statements about white racism of being racist in their own right, its interactional significance is rather high. It effectively sends a signal to white people that they should think twice before expressing disagreement. Drawing this line in the sand, so to speak, may well prove more significant than any of the intellectual merits of the argument.

Masked Man Fallacy: One of the more interesting angles to this argument lies in the way it uses definition by extension to answer problems arising from definition by intention. Many of the problems alluded to here arise when statements about white racism appear to implicate whites as a universal class. This can be done explicitly (by saying “all whites” or something to that effect) or by implication (e.g. “white people are like…), which suggests a universal implication without explicitly asserting the quantifier. Either way, a good portion of the objections here come directly from concerns about the possible unfairness or inaccuracy of such categorical assertions. The argument then asks those concerned about such problems to think of themselves as the exception and hence to drop their objections. The problem with this approach lies in the fact that the objections arise precisely because such statements do not admit of exceptions. In effect, the argument answers a question about the intentional meaning of an assertion (everyone?) by virtue of an unspoken extensional consideration (well, not me!).

It should also be said that some white people might object to categorical assertions about white people without necessarily thinking of themselves as the exceptions.

Micro-Reasoning: This was likely a tweet to begin with, and the argument is certainly short. There is only so much precision that can be expected of reasoning presented with such brevity.

Motte and Baily Doctrines: I think it’s fair to see this argument as an attempt to shift between motte and baily (perhaps to defend the bailey from the motte). If we imagine a qualified statement (e.g. ‘some white people do x’) as the motte and a categorical assertion along the same lines (e.g. ‘white people do x’ or even ‘all white people do x’) as the bailey, this argument appears to be a case of someone trying to defend the bailey from the confines of the motte. In effect, the author is saying that there is no need to assert the existence of exceptions because you can just imagine yourself as one of them.

No True Scotsman Fallacy: Normally this fallacy is applied in an effort to defend a positive generalization, but you could see this argument as an invitation for people to imagine themselves as the obvious exception to a negative generalization. You may fit in this awful category, but you’re not REALLY one of them. You get a pass! And since you get a pass, there will be no need to question the generalization, which I won’t be rethinking, because anyone who doesn’t fit the narrative also gets that free pass and we are all good, right?

This too is the NTS fallacy.

Satire: I’ve been dumping on this argument pretty hard, but there is at least one way of thinking about it that might redeem the argument a bit, as a sort of satirical ladder which must be pulled up after one has climbed it. It is as if the author is entertaining the prospect of an exception, only to suggest that that is in itself absurd. What if I really do try to imagine myself as a non-racist? Sure, I’m liberal. Sure, I have black friends (and other clichés). Sure, I disavow racism, and try hard not to discriminate, but can I really say that I am completely free of racist thoughts and deeds? What about that one thing I said last year that I’m still kicking myself about? And then there was that one time, …I mean, I didn’t mean to, but… The point here is that while we can distinguish between people whose personal orientation is more or less consciously racist, we probably cannot point to a person whose thoughts and deeds do not reflect racist assumptions under any circumstances. This is at least one of the implications of systemic racism.

By this approach, the point of the argument would be to let the would-be exception struggle with their own self-awareness a bit, and in the end hopefully conclude they are not so free of racism after all. In effect, the argument starts off by letting people try to make a distinction between racist and non-racist white people only to realize the distinction is untenable.

Whether or not this is what the original author had in mind, I cannot say. I do think that much of the rhetoric for which this kind of argument could be offered as a defense is far more personal and far less subtle than would be consistent with this approach. Simply put, when someone is called racist, the implication is virtually always about their own personal orientation and even moral characteristics. Such accusations are not (normally) about abstract connections to large-scale patterns of social inequity.

Thought Policing: Insofar as the argument effectively stigmatizes any dissenting views, this does suggest a degree of thought policing. That will work better in some contexts than others, but then again it also appears more in some contexts than others.

Transposition: In diagram 2, the inference from 3 to 1 would work by transposition. This is also true of the inference from 1 to 3 in diagram 3. Suffice to say that those inferences are deductively valid.

Evaluation: Obviously, I do not consider this argument sound. Whatever the diagram, the main problem is the implausibility of the central notion that one might object if and only if she is racist. There are a few different ways to imagine this connection, but none of them really work, So, statement 2 doesn’t work as a starting premise for any version of this argument.

Final Thoughts: There is another problem at the root of all those associated with this argument. It’s choice people make in their rhetoric, and that choice involves a real trade-off in terms of the impact one makes on a conversation. Simply put, qualified statements don’t have anywhere near the impact that generalizations (even implied generalizations) can generate. Once people can imagine themselves as one of the good guys, it becomes all to easy to do just that and a nation full of people who know damned well there is a problem can’t seem to find anyone actually responsible for doing anything about it. Also, it doesn’t help that qualified statements are often quantified in vague ways. Changing “all whites are racist” to “some whites are racist” or even “many whites are racist” weakens the claim without actually adding much in the way of precision. Under these circumstances, the temptation to go with a generalization is certainly strong. Leaving out quantifiers altogether (e.g. ‘whites are racist’) still gives an author the strength of a generalization while reserving the possibility of admitting exemptions when pressed about it. So, this kind of quasi-universal language seems to have become a common solution to the problem.

Not surprisingly, a range of would-be allies and folks who fancy themselves as non-racist or even anti-racist are uncomfortable hearing statements that implicate them in racist thought and practice. Hence, the “not all…” rejoinders. Naturally, such responses weaken the impact of the claims in question and often serve to derail the conversation altogether as people haggle over the possibility that some white folks might not be so bad. Strong advocates of social justice thus have an interest in silencing these rejoinders, some of which might be thought of as sealioning or engaging in philosophy dude-bro behavior. Hence, we get arguments like the one presented here.

The problem is that the problem is real, just as the original problem is real.

Pardon me: The problem (with this argument and others like it) is that the problem (of exceptions to sweeping generalizations) is real, just as the original problem (racism) is real.

People have to decide which of these matters more to them and what they want to do about it. This argument reflects a clear choice of priorities; but it also reflects an attempt to force the issue in some very problematic ways.

When “They” is One or Two or Maybe Legion

Introduction: This argument can be found on a Youtube presentation by James Lindsay entitled, “Stealing the Motte: Critical Social Justice and the Principle of Charity.” It is one of many arguments he directs against what he calls “critical social justice theory.” It is part of a larger series of audio-clips published under the title of “New Discourses.” This is the parent-site for the publication.

Key Facts: I believe Lindsay is referring to the this paper, published in Hipatia Press. It’s title doesn’t entirely match his own description, but it’s close enough that I do believe this is the one he has in mind.

Text: This is a small portion of text taken from the transcript provided by Youtube. He goes on to elaborate on the details of the article and on his own reasons for referring to social justice as a virus.

I want to focus on the claim that social justice critics refer to their own movement as a virus, treating that as the conclusion of his argument for purposes of this argument.

“I’ve both written and 16:50 spoken in fact about how critical social 16:53 justice is like a virus on our liberal 16:55 societies and I have to do that again 16:56 here because it’s just the best metaphor 17:00 for understanding it but before 17:02 reminding you of that I have to remind 17:06 you also that I’m not characterizing 17:08 them as viruses I’m not making a case 17:11 about them that they don’t make about 17:13 themselves they call themselves viruses 17:16 as well and compare the theory to it 17:19 anyway in activism and so I’m not in any 17:22 way trying to untie him unfairly here as 17:25 I’ve noted before in 2016 to feminist 17:29 scholars Bram foz and Michael Carter 17:31 published an academic paper in a 17:32 relatively small academic journal and it 17:35 carried the title women’s studies as a 17:36 virus institutional feminism effect in 17:39 the projection of danger in that paper 17:42 Falls and Carter make the point that 17:44 women’s studies should see itself 17:45 through the metaphor of the virus 17:49 comparing the discipline if you will in 17:51 favorable terms to other plagues like 17:54 Ebola and HIV and unless you think I 17:57 exaggerate I can quote 17:58 them on this…”


Comments: Yes, I found it while reading up on Motte and Bailey doctrines.

Statements: Using the claim critical social justice activists refer to themselves as the conclusion of the argument means we leave a lot of this passage out of the argument (hence the unnumbered statements below). Were we to address the accuracy of Lindsay’s treatment of the article in question, we would need to add a great deal more to the analysis. What I have included here is sufficient to address the relevance of this one article to Lindsay’s generalizations about social justice activism.

I also cleaned up a few things the transcript appears to have gotten wrong. In any event, I believe the argument is as follows.


I’ve both written and spoken in fact about how critical social justice is like a virus on our liberal societies and I have to do that again here because it’s just the best metaphor for understanding it but before reminding you of that I have to remind you also that I’m not characterizing them as viruses I’m not making a case about them that they don’t make about themselves.

[1] they call themselves viruses as well and compare the theory to it anyway in (or possibly ‘and’) activism

and so I’m not in any way trying to characterize them unfairly here. as I’ve noted before

[2] in 2016 two feminist scholars Breanne Fahs and Michael Karger published an academic paper in a relatively small academic journal.


[3] it carried the title “Women’s Studies as a Virus; Institutional Feminism, affect, and the Projection of Danger”

[4] In that paper Fahs and Carter make the point that women’s studies should see itself through the metaphor of the virus,comparing the discipline if you will in favorable terms to other plagues like Ebola and HIV…”

Diagram: If statement 2 here draws our attention to an article in which two feminists refer to women’s studies as a virus, statements 3 and 4 elaborate on the significance of the paper. These combine together to form the claim that social justice theorists refer to themselves and their own movement as a virus (statement 1). This is then taken as evidence that Lindsay is not characterizing social justice advocates unfairly when he himself describes their movement as a virus, but that is a part of the larger argument which I do not purport to analyze here.

2+3+4 -> 1

Discussion: This argument raises the following themes: Ad Hominem, Anaphora, Anecdotal Reasoning, Authority, Cherry Picking, Hasty Generalization, Poisoning the Well, Principle of Charity.

Ad Hominem: Whatever the reasons Fahs and Karger have for describing feminism as a virus, Lindsay’s own goal is convince his audience that anyone associated with critical social justice theory is a terrible person engaged in terrible things. It is a sustained attack on a broad range of scholarship. Lindsay does not make an effort to show that social justice critics are wrong, so much as that they are dangerous and positively evil. To suggest that his approach to the subject constitutes an ad hominem-circumstantial is putting it mildly.

Anaphora: One of the distinctive features of this presentation is the undisciplined use of anaphoric reference. Lindsay’s use of ‘they’ and ‘them’ throughout the audio enables him to skip a lot of interesting questions about why he is really talking about at any given time. In this passage, the shift from two specific authors publishing a single paper in a “relatively small academic journal” to the claim that social justice theorists as a whole characterize their work as a virus leans rather heavily on Lindsays use of ‘they’ and ‘them.’ In this case, the shift from his evidence to his conclusion entails a jump from feminism to critical social justice theory and a jump from a sample of two to the whole of critical theory. Using this language enables Lindsay to presuppose the relevance of his evidence to his conclusion without stating its terms explicitly.

Anecdotal Reasoning: Insofar as Lindsay is providing a story about a single paper in support of a sweeping generalization about a broad range of scholarship, this constitutes a good example of anecdotal reasoning.

Authority: One of the more charitable ways of interpreting this argument would be to treat it as an authority-based argument. I say it’s charitable, because the alternative is to suggest that a same of two authors is sufficient to speak for the entirely of scholars identifying themselves as critical theorists, which invites the Hasty Generalization comments below. If on the other hand, Lindsay wishes to suggest that Fahs and Karger have authority to speak on a nature of this trend because they are part of it, that is at least a little more interesting. Still, there is little reason to believe these two scholars have the authority to define the entirety of social justice scholarship. Even their own article falls well short of such a claim, being focused on women’s studies.

Cherry Picking: The selection of a single article employing language comparable to Lindsay’s own smacks of cherry picking.

Hasty Generalization: A sample of one article and two feminists simply is not enough evidence to demonstrate, as Lindsay claims that this is how critical social justice advocates describe themselves. Its not even close.

Interactional Eclipse: One big problem with describing any human beings or movement of human beings in terms of a virus is that any descriptive value this account might have is likely to be overshadowed by the pejorative implications. Fahs and Karger may have been happy to use an exciting narrative for feminism, but for his own part, Lindsay is even happier to use a metaphor that effectively dehumanizes Fahs and Karger, and if he has his way, everyone associated with social justice or critical theory. In effect, the insult here is is the point. The argument, for Linday, at any rate, is little more than a pretext for that insult.

Poisoning the Well: This entire Youtube presentation is an effort to convince Lindsay’s audience that social justice critics are out to destroy liberal society, and hence, they are unworthy of the principle of charity. To say that this is an exercise in poisoning the well is also putting it mildly.

Principle of Charity: I can think of two ways to interpret the use of a single article by two scholars within one sub-field associated with social justice to characterize all of the social justice movement. One way is to think of it as a representative sample, and the other is to think of it as an authority-based argument. Either way, the argument fails.

Evaluation: The argument fails because this one article simply isn’t sufficient to warrant a generalization about social justice critics as a whole.

Final Thoughts: This is of course part of a much larger argument. Independent of his claim that social justice theorists characterize themselves as a virus, Lindsay does offer his own reasons for thinking of critical social justice theory as a virus. Whether or not these are worthy of consideration is another question.

There is another angle here insofar we could try to unpack Lindsay’s phrasing. The term “critical social justice activism” fuses together quite a few different things. I don’t think he is wrong in suspecting that these things are related, but the effort to just fuse them all into one term is a little disconcerting, particularly when it is couple with clear efforts to poison the well for anyone associated with this amalgam. Whether or not Lindsay’s work is worth the effort is also another question.

Scratch A Hasty Handler

Introduction: On March 30th, 2020, Dave Rubin whose talk show, The Rubin Report appears on BlazeTV tweeted the message here in response to tweet by comedian, Chelsea Handler.

Key Facts: Handler is commenting on the trial of Dereck Chauvin, a police officer accused the murder of George Floyd during an arrest in May, 2020. A video of Chauvin pressing his knee onto Floyd’s neck for roughly 9 minutes during the incident went viral shortly thereafter, putting this case in the national spotlight.

BlazeTV the channel which features Dave Rubin’s show was created by Glenn Beck. It is generally considered to be a conservative operation.

Chelsea Handler had her own television show from 2017 to 2015, Chelsea Lately, on the E-Network. Her politics is generally considered liberal to progressive.


Handler: “So pathetic that there is a trial to prove that Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd when there is video of him doing so.”

Rubin: “Scratch a progressive, find a fascist.”


Comments: It is entirely possible that either or both of these individuals are engaging in outrage farming.

Statements: As Rubin is using Handler’s comment as evidence for his own comment about progressive politics, the issue is how best represent that argument. We would frame it as an unspoken assumption Rubin, thus spelling out the entire argument as a representation of his own reasoning or we could frame it as a kind Dialectic in which Rubin is responding to Handler.

A second question relates to the significance of Rubin’s conclusion. It seems reasonable to suggest that the terms of the phrasing imply an “if, then” construction, hence option 2b. It also seems reasonable to take Rubin as advancing a general statement about progressive politics, hence 2c. Both of these require some rewriting, raising questions about how accurate the paraphrasing might be.

[1a] “So pathetic that there is a trial to prove that Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd when there is video of him doing so.”

[1b] [Chelsea Handler said] “So pathetic that there is a trial to prove that Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd when there is video of him doing so.”

[2a] Scratch a progressive, find a fascist.

[2b] [If you] scratch a progressive, [you] find a fascist.

[2c] [Deep down, progressives are fascists.]

Diagram: Each statement comes in different versions, but the diagram looks the same either way.

1 -> 2

Discussion: This argument raises the following themes; Ad Hominem, Dialectic, Hasty Generalization, Hyperbole, Micro-Reasoning, Missing Assertions, Outrage Farming.

Ad Hominem: Insofar as Rubin responds to Handler, by using her evidence as grounds for a generalization about progressive politics, his comment is certainly a personal attack, albeit one against a collective target. As he does not appear to be using this as a means of refuting her own claim so much as a means of attacking progressive politics, it seems unlikely that this would qualify as an ad hominem fallacy.

Dialectic: As this argument plays out in an exchange between two different people, it seems reasonable to think of it as a form of dialectic, albeit not a very profound one.

Hasty Generalization: I think, this is the heart of the argument. Rubin is using a single comment from a single progressive celebrity as the basis for a comment about progressives in general. To say that this is a hasty generalization is putting it mildly. There may also be a question about whether or not Handler’s comment, objectionable as it may be, really amounts to fascism, but the inference remains a hasty generalization in any event.

Hyperbole: It seems unlikely that Dave Rubin really thinks Handler’s comment shows us that progressives are fascists, though that is the literal import of his own comment. So, it is probably best to think of this argument as hyperbolic.

Micro-Reasoning: Both Handler’s and Rubin’s posts are single comments. Although there is reasoning here, it is extremely brief, making it hard to assess the actual nature of the reasoning.

Missing Assertions: If we try to represent the entire argument as coming from Rubin, then we have to construct a sentence that represents handler’s own comment as a fact in his own argument. It’s a simple matter of translating the quote function in twitter into the form of a statement containing a quote. This is statement 1b.

Outrage Farming: While I am focusing on Rubin’s argument here, Handler’s own comments are hardly helpful. Many regard Chauvin’s guilt as obvious, but denying someone their day in court is problematic to say the least, and Handler too may be engaging in hyperbole here. It seems likely that both of these figures are engaging in rhetorical brinkmanship with the intention of riling up their critics as well as their fans. In this case, the anger some may feel at Handler for taking an extreme position may be the point. The same may be true of Rubin’s comments.

Evaluation: The argument is unsound as it is a hasty generalization.

Final Thoughts: Twitter does not seem to encourage moderation. Then again, neither do the careers of pundits or political comedians.

David Silverman on Atheist Bilboards

Introduction: This is a tweet from David Silverman (President of American Atheists) defending the practice of placing billboards critical of religious views in public places.

Key Facts: David Silverman is the President of American Atheists which is a non-profit organization promoting the interests of nonbelievers in the United States. Under Silverman’s leadership, American Atheists have put up a number of public billboards promoting atheism and criticizing religion. These billboards have themselves drawn criticism from religious figures and in some non-believers as well. Some of the criticisms have been directed at specific themes and specific statements included in the billboards. Others have been directed against the general wisdom of putting such statements out into the public.

Text: This is the tweet in question.



Comments: Two general points come to mind when considering this argument.

One is the possibility of a double standard in reference to billboards expressing a stance on religious topics. Christians in particular have been accustomed to producing such statements for as long as some of us can recall. The placement of anti-religious sentiments on a public billboard is however a relatively new practice, and it may draw more criticism due in part to the unusual nature of the messages. Simple confirmation Bias may be another factor insofar as the bulk of the public is unlikely to agree with an overtly atheistic message.

A second concern lies in the potential obfuscation of specific concerns about specific billboards. While this particular tweet addresses the issue in the abstract, some of the concerns raised about these billboards have been about very specific details about specific billboards put out by American Atheists, This is particularly true of those raised by unbelievers – whom Silverman presents as the party he intends to answer here.

Statements: The argument is set out as follows. Two missing statements [4] and [5] have been added. [4]  helps to seal the relevance of statements 2 and 3 to the rest of the argument and [5] is most likely the intended conclusion of the argument.

[1] Atheists who object to billboards attacking religion are ALSO victims of religious indoctrination.

[2] Lies deserve death.

[3] [Lies do not deserve] Protection.

[[4]] [Religious claims are lies.]

[[5]] [Atheists ought not to oppose billboards attacking religion.]

Discussion: Issues raised by this argument include the following; ad hominem, Interactional eclipse, micro-reasoning, missing statements, the principle of charity, provincialism, and thought policing.

Ad Hominem: The assertion that critics (atheist or otherwise) of billboards promoting atheism are victims of religious indoctrination is an ad hominem (circumstantial). If there is a non-fallacious way to interpret that suggestion it would be to treat it as a simple explanation to be taken at face value. In others words, it would be possible to simply think of this as an empirical question about the motivations of a select group of people. The second statement in the tweet, however, belies this interpretation as it makes it clear Silverman means to argue with his critics. This is not simply a diagnosis; it is an attempt to undermine the credibility of billboard critics.

Interactional Eclipse: To the degree that this argument constitutes a form of thought policing, it is explicitly an attempt to subvert efforts to engage in critical thinking about the value of anti-religious billboards through appeal to social dynamics. Whatever the value of the argument, any resulting debate is more likely to generate more heat than light.

Micro-Reasoning: As with most (if not all) tweets, the brevity of this argument is a problem, hence the need to supply nearly as many missing statements as those clearly expressed.

Missing Assertions: The intended conclusion of this argument is most likely some statement intended to discourage unbelievers from engaging in criticism of billboards promoting atheism. I have accordingly supplied statement 5 as an attempt to express this missing statement.

I would also suggest an additional Missing Assumption (statement [4] that religious views are lies). If this assumption is not true, then both statement 2 and 3 fail to produce anything of value in the argument.

Principle of Charity: It isn’t entirely clear whether Silverman means to suggest this argument applies to all instances in which atheists prove critical of billboards attacking religion or simply those who do so on principle (I.e. those who object categorically to the creation of such billboards instead of those with particular objections to specific billboards). His wording could facilitate either interpretation, and it is likely those who agree with him will include parties adopting each interpretation.

For purposes of keeping the discussion thoughtful it is probably best to treat this argument as applying only to those who object to such billboards in general. The alternative would in effect amount to a blank check to produce any content (no matter how foolish) critical of religion without fear of counter-criticism from other atheists. That would hardly be a reasonable position, so it’s not the most productive interpretation of the argument to pursue here.

Provincialism: Insofar as this argument seems to be encouraging atheists to be less like religious people, it could be viewed as an appeal to provincialism. Essentially, the appeal here is something along the lines of; ‘this is how WE act” or even “this is how WE should behave.” Well, WE (i.e. atheists) may or may not typically fall prey to religious indoctrination, but that appeal isn’t very cogent.

Thought Policing: One of the more compelling features of this argument lies in its implied comparison with believers. It is not merely that Silverman is suggesting that his atheist critics have been indoctrinated; he is reminding atheists that the conduct in question is unbecoming for unbelievers..This is classic thought policing., which goes a little beyond the normal ad hominem to invoke peer pressures and trigger loyalties associated with group membership. Just how significant such loyalties may be for atheists is an interesting question, but the argument still works this angle. The social dynamics at issue thus overshadow the rational significance of the argument itself.

Diagram: I take it that 2 and 3 are intended (with missing assumption [4] to prove statement 1, which is in turn intended to demonstrate the truth of the missing conclusion (statement 5).

2+3+[4] -> 1 -> [5].


Evaluation: Let’s consider both inferences:

2+3+[4]=>1. The truth of each of the assumptions in this inference would certainly be debatable. It isn’t clear that religious claims are all untrue (much less that they are lies), nor is it clear that lies deserve death (which is presumably a metaphor indicating the discrediting of such claims and a hope that they will eventually cease to circulate). If we assume by protection that Silverman means only protection from criticism (and not protection from coercive sanctions, then perhaps statement 3 fairs reasonably well in the truth evaluation, though a creative thinker could probably find a reason to protect at least some lies.

The inference itself fairs no better. It isn’t clear that objections to the billboards are offered in an attempt to ‘protect’ religion. Nor is it clear that the billboards play any constructive role in advancing the demise of religious beliefs.

If one doesn’t assume the charitable interpretation of Silverman’s intent, the problem becomes still sharper insofar as specific concerns about specific billboards may well address the effectiveness of those billboards in advancing a critique of religion.

4 -> 5: This is arguably an ad hominem (circumstantial) and/or an argument from Provincialism, as outlined above. In either event, the inference would be fallacious. Also, the argument side-steps the possibility that atheists might have reasons to oppose the billboard campaign other than latent sympathy for religious sentiment.

Also, if we do not adopt the charitable interpretation of Silverman’s position, it seems clear that atheists (even those who genuinely hope to confront religion whenever possible) may have a number of concerns about specific messages contained on specifi billboards.

I think the argument has to be considered unsound.

Final Thoughts: In the end, this argument does strike me as a simple effort to engage in thought policing. It effectively urges atheists to support their own camp regardless of any concerns they may have about the specific messages placed on these billboards or the general effectiveness of public billboards as a means of challenging religious views.

The Ad Hominem Fallacy (Includes the Argument from Authority)

Ad hominem arguments substitute commentary on a person or persons for an evaluation of the claims they make and the evidence they put forward for accepting those claims. Personal commentary is not always fallacious, but very often it is. Ad hominem arguments come in a variety of forms, but we can divide them into roughly two types; those that present criticism of the target (i.e. the subject of the personal commentary) as a reason for rejecting claim made by the individual in question and those authority arguments that misuse the personal credibility of a source for a claim.

Critical Ad Hominems

In each of these cases, personal commentary about the target of the ad hominem has been used as a reason to reject a claim she has made even when that claim is not directly related to the personal information presented about her.

Ad Hominem (Abusive): This is perhaps the most common form of an ad hominem argument. It consists of an attack on the person in question for the purpose of dismissing something she has to say. One could for example suggest that a professor of history doesn’t know her topic because she dresses funny, behaves rudely, or speaks with an odd accent. In either case the issue at hand is completely irrelevant to the truth value of any claims that professor has made on the subject of history. Although at least one of these possibilities (that of being rude to students) could be a very serious issue in its own right, it is not a reason to doubt the credibility of a professor on the subject of her expertise.

This type of ad hominem certainly includes outright insults. In politics, for example, it used to be common to call adversaries to the left ‘Commies’ and those on the right ‘fascists’. This abusive vocabulary has shifted a bit of late (and so we sometimes hear folks accused of being both communists and fascists at the same time). Those skeptical of religion may refer to the faithful as ‘superstitious’ while believers sometimes refer to their critics as ‘nihilists’ who believe in nothing at all. An art critic may be called a ‘philistine’. A magazine may be dismissed as a ‘rag’. We can find similar themes for a broad range of subject areas. While it is by no means clear that all references using derogatory language are fallacious, they are certainly fallacious when they are used to dismiss a point of view without providing a direct critique of it.

Because an ad hominem is not merely irrelevant, it is also rude, people often fall into the habit of confusing the issues (rudeness and lack of logical relevance). Internet discussion forums will for example admonish users to refrain from committing ad hominems as if the irrelevance of insults were the real concern to forum administrators whereas such rules are almost always about preserving the peace and reducing personal conflict. That is a question of behavior, not one of relevance. It is important to remember that what makes an ad hominem a fallacy is not the rudeness of the commentary, or even the way it makes another person feel; it is the irrelevance of those comments to the conclusion of the argument.

It should be added that the presence of disrespectful or outright abusive language in an argument does not ensure that the full argument can be dismissed as an ad hominem fallacy. If an argument contains an otherwise compelling line of reasoning, it does not become fallacious because its author has added an insult or three. In such cases the abusive commentary neither adds to nor detracts from the argument in question, though it may raise ethical issues in its own right. An argument becomes an ad hominem (abusive) when the insults themselves are treated as a reason for dismissing the target of the criticism.

Ad Hominem (Benign)?: I don’t recall ever having read anything about this myself, but I’m inclined to think that positive commentary on the character of an individual could also be used to generate an irrelevant basis for accepting something they have said. If the positive commentary amounts to a case for authority, then, this would be an authority based argument. If they lean heavily on personal identity (say; telling someone that another individual is a good Christian), then this could be an appeal to colloquialism, but it is at least possible that we could encounter praise that doesn’t fall into any other category of fallacy, but which is nevertheless used as a reason to accept as true something they have said. If, for example, you responded to someone expressing disagreement with a claim made by a friend by reminding them that the individual is a good and decent person, then this would be a fallacious argument from authority, albeit one that is not abusive in nature. I think I’ve encountered this before. Others might suggest different ways of looking at the problem, but I think it fair to suggest it is a form of ad hominem argument.

Ad Hominem (Circumstantial): The ad hominem (circumstantial) argument is tricky. Some sources will consider this a valid (and hence non-fallacious) form of argumentation, and some varieties of critical theory seem to use it on a regular basis. This form of ad hominem occurs whenever someone calls into question the motives and/or biases of another party, thus undermining her claims by commenting directly on her personal reasons for making those claims.

In politics for example, it has become common to suggest that liberals favor social welfare programs in order to keep minorities dependent on the Democratic Party. Conversely, libertarians are often said to be tools of large corporations. Christian apologists will sometimes suggest that atheists are simply seeking to avoid responsibility for their sins, and non-believers often suggest that religious beliefs are thinly-veiled mechanisms of social control. In each of these examples, questions about the motives or cognitive limitations of those targeted have been substituted for a critique of their point of view.

The ad hominem (circumstantial) needn’t involve an assertion of vested interests. It might also address cognitive biases and emotional states as in the case where religious beliefs are dismissed as products of brain-washing (or at least as the mere accident of upbringing …”you only chose catholicism because you were brought up in a Catholic home.”). Conversely, in his book, The Faith of the Fatherless, Paul Vitz famously advanced the theory that there is a link between atheism and fatherlessness (or at least problematic to relationships with father figures). Whatever the (de-)merits if this psychological theory in itself, whenever Vitz’s theories have been used to discredit atheist views, that use is an example of the ad hominem (Circumstantial).

Problem: What makes this particular form of ad hominem tempting is the very real possibility that the judgment of the other individual has been swayed by personal circumstances. Since the cirumstances raised in the argument are in fact related to the claims in question, the relevance of the argument is trickier than the simple ad hominem (abusive). It is important to address large-scale biases in politics and other social institutions. So there are times when a well-documented account of such biases would be worth considering. This kind of argument remains problematic however insofar as it places an unreasonable burden on the party criticized.

In asserting that another party’s point of view is the product of personal bias and/or ulterior motives, one can bypass direct consideration of any claims made by the target of criticism. An argument using the ad hominem (circumstantial) may thus be equally effective whether it is directed against a well-reasoned position or one that is deeply flawed. An additional problem lies in the fact that some things which might appear as biases to some could as easily be viewed as sources of insight to others. (If a traumatic incident could be viewed as the sole reason for adopting a religious belief and hence rejected as a mere bias, it could as easily be described as a gift through which someone came to an unusual understanding of the world.)

So what should we do?

One way to approach this would be to inquire into the degree to which the personal credibility of the target is at issue in the first place. Where the target of an ad hominem (circumstantial) has presented objective reasons for their position, it would be inappropriate to use a critique of their probable biases against them. This leaves open the possibility of using the ad hominem (circumstantial) as a valid means of criticizing those whose personal credibility has been offered as grounds for accepting a claim. Simply put, if someone gives you an allegedly objective reason to believe something, it is best to set the ad hominem (circumstantial aside) and consider their argument. If they are content to rely on their personal credibility for validation of their views, then the ad hominem (circumstantial) goes directly to the issue of that credibility. It is then quite relevant.

An additional approach to this issue might be to develop a two-pronged response to those one suspects of having biases, presenting both a direct critique of their views and an argument on their biases at the same time. The first serves to show that they are wrong. The second helps to show why, and perhaps why it matters.

Ad Hominem (Tu QuoQue): This variation of an ad hominem argument occurs when someone uses a perceived inconsistency on the part of the target as an excuse to dismiss something she has said. This would normally occur in the context of discussing some moral proposition, concrete recommendation, or otherwise value laden topic. It happens when people talk about what folks ‘ought’ (or ‘ought not’) to do.

A certain degree of inconsistency is a pretty common feature of human behavior, but then again so is outrage at such inconsistencies. The prospect that someone is holding others to moral principles they don’t live up to themselves can be very frustrating. So, whenever people advance an ought without living up to it, we should not be surprised to see someone respond with a tu quoque fallacy.

The central problem with a tu quoque fallacy lies in the fact that any degree of inconsistency on the part of someone advancing a value does nothing to show that the value itself is not a good one. Even a person who has done nothing whatsoever to live up to a value may be quite right to insist on its importance. One might suggest to such people that they really ought to take their own sermons to heart, but not that their sins disproved the messages of those sermons (so to speak).

As I write this, for example, President Obama is pursuing negotiations with the state of Iran over a prospective deal regarding nuclear power in that country. Republican senator Tom Cotton penned an open letter to Iranian officials calling the deal into question, and 47 Republican Senators signed the document. Many Democrats have argued that this is a severe breach of protocol insofar as it is not appropriate for members of congress to interfere directly in diplomatic negotiations with a foreign country. In response to this, some Republicans have pointed out that Democratic senators have done similar things in the past, thus underscoring the hypocrisy of Democrat’s criticizing Cotton and his cosigners. But of course the alleged inconsistency on the part of Democrats here does not prove that they are wrong about Senator Cotton’s actions. It could as easily prove that they were wrong themselves when any of their number did likewise.

This example illustrates an additional feature of the tu quoque fallacy, that it is often reflexive, i.e. that the accusation of inconsistent behavior may facilitate the same. In the previous example, those accusing the Democrats of shifting positions on the propriety of direct messages to foreign ministers in opposition to the President may effectively shift their own position on the subject. In effect, some Republicans may support Cotton (by accusing Democrats of hypocrisy), even if they condemned past examples of Democratic interference in Diplomatic negotiations by Republican Presidents. The Republcans thus get to flip-flop on the issue while advancing the criticism that their opponents have done the same. I like to call this the meta-hypocrisy shuffle, and it is particularly common in politics.

Yes, the reverse occurs as well.


Qualifiers (Non-Fallacious Variants of Ad Hominem): It should be noted that ad hominem fallacies are not always considered irrelevant. When a person (and/or her character) is the topic of discussion to begin with, it certainly is not fallacious to speak about them or their behavior. So, for example, if someone has asked which American President is the worst in history, it would not be fallacious to say bad things about any one of them. far from irrelevant, that would actually be the point of the discussion. Likewise, it is not fallacious to subject authority claims in support of a conclusion to personal scrutiny. Neither would it be fallacious to refuse to discuss an issue with someone on account of personal criticism. It is one thing to say that someone is wrong because you don’t like them and quite another to say that you don’t wish to discuss their views at all. Finally, if the point of an insult is simply to insult another person without trying to prove them wrong on a particular claim, then that may be mean, but it is not a fallacy. What distinguishes an ad hominem fallacy from the many other varieties of personal criticism and abuse is the use of that personal criticism to discredit a point of view.

Most importantly, there are contexts in which personal criticism may be directly relevant to arguments from authority. When told, for example, that a given professor has taken a stand on the wisdom of a given economic policy, it would not necessarily be fallacious to note that her degree was in poetry (rather than economics), to note that her degree (in whatever field it may be) came from a disreputable institution, or to suggest that other foolish claims made by the professor brought her understanding of the topic into question. Such arguments would be relevant precisely to the degree that they answer any assertion that the professor’s expertize was sufficient reason to accept her conclusions on the policy. This would not prove her wrong, per se, but such criticisms could effectively be used to negate any authority she may be presumed to possess.

Litmus Test: In considering whether or not an argument commits the ad hominem fallacy, ask yourself if personal information about someone has been used as a reason to reject something they have said. If so, first double check to see if that personal information might be relevant after all. If not, then this is most likely an ad hominem fallacy. If the personal information amounts to an attack, then this is an ad hominem (abusive). If the personal information calls into question the target’s motives and personal biases for taking a position, then the argument is an ad hominem (circumstantial). If the personal information calls into question the consistency of the individual’s words or deeds, then it is a tu quoque.

Fallacious Appeal to Authority

A fallacious appeal to authority isn’t normally described as an ad hominem, but it too consists of an appeal to personal information when more objective arguments are called for. So, it seems reasonable to consider it a variety of ad hominem, and that is the approach we are taking here. Appeal to authority is not always fallacious insofar as one might reasonably offer the expertise of a learned individual as a good reason to think her claims are true, provided the claims fall within the overall topic of her expertise. Problems arise when folks are cited outside the context of legitimate expertise. This can happen in a variety of different ways.

Agonistic Authority: Sometimes people will cite someone on the opposite side of a controversy in support of a claim likely to cut against their interests. The argument often sounds a bit like this; “even this guy says ___, so it must be true.” In effect, such arguments use the unlikely concession of a theoretical opponent in support of a conclusion. The thinking seems to be that because someone on the other side would be adverse to the claim, they would not concede its truth unless there were good reason to do so, but of course people may have other reasons for making an apparent concession to the other side. This may include unnoticed differences between the goals of specific parties within a given interest group or even simple rivalries that could eclipse genuine interests. It can also include serious incompetence on the part of the person making the concession or even deliberate efforts to build bridges and facilitate goodwill regardless of the merits of the claim in question. It is simply isn’t safe to assume that when someone on the other side of an issue makes a concession, they do so for good reason. One could probably establish in some instances that the source of such a concession is credible and reasonable in their judgement, but the process of figuring that out is likely to produce better arguments than one could get out of this very ironic appeal to authority.

Anonymous Authority: This may seem absurd, but authority is often cited without identifying a particular source. This occurs for example when people say that they have read a study without naming it or when someone tells you that they have read statistics proving some point without providing any reference to those statistics. It occurs when students cite “the internet” as their source on an assignment, and even when they cite Wikipedia (as this alone does not tell us who has provided the information they have pulled from it). It should perhaps go without saying that when citing authority one should at least know who the authority is, but people (even highly educated people) often make use of short-hand references to authorities existing somewhere out there, so to speak.

Authority by Association: Authority is sometimes invoked by association. This occurs when close friends or relatives of a given authority are cited on a given subject without providing any substantive reason to believe they are themselves experts or that they have any insights into the views of their authoritative friend/relative. Granted, such individuals may know something about the authority’s point of view on the subject (it’s at least possible) but they may also take advantage of their relationship to express views of their own under the authority of their relationship.

Documentary films and television may also conjure the effect of authority by association when mixing interviews with genuine authorities and those of individuals without any real expertise on the subject at hand. If the viewer isn’t careful, she may not notice the difference. Alternatively, she may forget which source provided which piece of information when recalling the film later. It’s a pretty simple mistake, but one that is easily made, and one which is often encouraged by unscrupulous film-makers.

One would do well to ensure that any authorities one is asked to consider are the actual sources of the claims to which their expertise has been applied, and not merely someone associated with an expert on the subject.

Out of Field Authority: It sometimes happens that a legitimate authority makes a claim outside her own field of expertise. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, and great scholars often make real contributions to fields outside those of their own training and research, but it is important to remember the limits of expert credibility. One would not want to mistake expertise in engineering for expertise in economics, nor that of anthropology for physics. The point here is not to dismiss everything a scholar says outside the field of her own training or research, but to refrain from giving extra weight to their views on the sole basis of expertise in a completely unrelated field.

On a related subject, one should be wary of abstract references to expertise. If a scholar who makes much of possessing a PhD without providing any indication as to field in which she obtained (or the institution which provided it), this is a definite red flag. When presenting credible bona fides, an individual will normally detail the specific degree belonging to her and/or university in which she earned it. Better yet, a professor will normally list the department and institution in which they work. This isn’t always the case, but it’s a common enough trick that one ought to watch out for it. This information doesn’t have to be on the first thing they tell you, but it should certainly be available. If someone wants you to know they have a PhD, but doesn’t tell you much more than that, you may well be looking at someone who is writing outside their field and doesn’t want you to realize this. Unless she has some other basis for claiming expertise on the subject, one would do well to regard such bona fides with suspicion.

Decontextualized Authority: I suppose it shouldn’t need to be said that authorities can be cited out of context, but it happens rather often. Ideally one should expect to learn something about the overall subject at issue and the general point of any larger text or utterance in which a quoted statement appeared. Still, it is common to read quotes without any effort even to identify the source materials at all. This practice is sometimes referred to as quote-mining, and it has become particularly common with the proliferation of visual memes on the internet. It’s worth noting that a number of the quotations floating around the net are simply undocumented, and indeed quite a few may be outright fakes. For this reason Both Monticello and Mount Vernon, for example, have web-pages devoted to the spurious quotes attributed respectively to Thomas Jefferson and George Washington. This hasn’t stopped others from passing those fake quotes off on websites all across the net as well as occasional books and speeches.

The problem with quote-mining goes far beyond spurious quotations, however, insofar as any attempt to invoke someone as an authority ought to include a reasonable effort to account for the context in which she has weighed in on the topic at hand. Often an author’s real point will turn out to be something entirely different than one would gather from a single pithy line. You might find that a given quote seems to resonate without knowing such details, but lacking the context in which it occurred, there is little reason to treat any one-liner from any source as an authoritative statement on any given subject.

Non-Authorities: One of the most common ways in which authority arguments go astray lies in citing people as experts when they simply are not experts in anything at all, as when for example celebrities are treated as experts (…“I’m not a doctor, but I play one on TV”). A somewhat subtler version of this problem arises when people come to be treated as experts in an area wherein they have achieved considerable success, thus giving the sense of their authority a degree of plausibility. Success in a given area may be due to any number of factors other than knowledge, so one shouldn’t be too quick to accept this kind of authority claim. it would be a mistake, for example, to assume a box-office megastar knew a great deal about acting or that a wealthy businessman fully understood economics. Such individuals may presumably know something about the subject in question, but their success is not predicated on their breadth of knowledge or upon their willingness to consider different aspects of the business they are in. So, while it might be interesting to hear the views of such individuals, it is probably best to stop short of accepting personal success as a proxy for expertise.

Qualifier (Non-Authorities are people too): Not being an authority is of course no crime, not even when that non-authority presumes to speak on an important subject in public. The rest of us speak on all sorts of topics we don’t know that much about, so why shouldn’t television and movie stars? There is no reason to expect that a celebrity should be silent on political matters, religion, climate, or crime, but one would not want to mistake their celebrity status for expertise.

Problematic Authority: Sometimes a scholar is legitimately speaking within her area of expertise, but that does not necessarily mean that she is making specific claims about which her personal authority ought to be taken as sufficient reason to accept her position. For example, one would not expect a philosopher of religion to include “God exists” as a true/false question on a test. She may have spent her entire career discussing just that very issue, the existence of God, but few would regard it as reasonable to use her authority to present the answer to this question as a settled fact. Clearly, there are some claims about matters that may fall within an individual’s area of expertise without generating sufficient grounds for acceptance of their claims on that basis alone. In most such cases, public disagreement with other scholars in the field maybe taken as a strong counter-indication. When a given question is subject to considerable dispute within a field, it would be a mistake to take the authority of a given expert as sufficient evidence to accept it


General Note: Some folks are inclined to reject all authority-based arguments as fallacious. This is particularly common when a reader is sufficiently versed in a field to evaluate the reasoning of experts with some degree of confidence. Someone with a Master’s in history may for example be less inclined to simply accept an argument based on the conclusions of a professional historian. She may expect to hear the details of that historian’s argument so that she can decide for herself whether or not he has presented a convincing account of the topic. Someone with less knowledge of the topic may be unprepared to address those details, in which case an authority-based argument may be the best one can offer them. Hence, the utility of an argument from authority is at least partly a function of the prior-knowledge of its intended audience.

Litmus Test: In considering whether or not an argument may commit the fallacy of authority, first ask if the argument bases any conclusions on the personal credibility of an individual. If so, then ask whether or not that person actually possesses any authority on the issue at hand. It may also be useful to ask whether or not the claims cited in the argument relate to factually knowable matters and/or if there is significant disagreement within the field on the truth of those claims. If the answer to the first 3 questions is ‘yes’ and the last one is ‘no’, then it may be reasonable to accept authority as the basis for accepting a claim. It might also be reasonable to expect a more substantive account of the expert’s reasons for making the claim, depending on one’s own willingness (and competence) to handle the details of the argument.